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3
SHARI’A AND HALAKHA IN NORTH AMERICA: 
INTRODUCTION 
MARK D. ROSEN, PROFESSOR, IIT CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW
Islamic religious law—shari’a—has come under attack in recent years 
as a system that threatens American freedoms. More quietly, there recently 
was an attempt in San Francisco to ban circumcision, a ritual central to 
both Jewish law (halakha) and Muslim law.1 And bans on both Jewish and 
Muslim modes of slaughtering animals have been enacted in a number of 
European countries.2 Indisputably, prejudice and hatred have played a large 
role in motivating these developments. But they have also raised some deep 
questions—generally untreated in media accounts—about how liberal de-
mocracies can and should accommodate legal systems that are not them-
selves originally grounded on liberal or democratic principles. One can 
pose a similar question from the opposite perspective: to what degree can, 
and should, religious systems of this sort adapt themselves to a liberal 
democratic environment? 
This volume reproduces the proceedings of a conference jointly spon-
sored by the IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law and the Jewish-Muslim 
Initiative at the University of Illinois-Chicago in April of 2013 that ad-
dressed these issues.3 The conference brought together Moslem and Jewish 
scholars, political activists and playwrights, journalists and judges. 
To begin, the conference organizers wanted to start with a concrete 
sense of ‘where we presently are’ in fact, taking account of what the Islam-
ic and Jewish communities view to be both the bad and the good. As to the 
bad, the conference aimed to better understand the anti-shari’a movement, 
as well as nascent moves to ban circumcision, ritual slaughter, and other 
 1.  See generally B.C., Circumcision and the Law: A Clash of Entitlements, ECONOMIST (Nov. 
14, 2013), http://www.economist.com/blogs/erasmus/2013/11/circumcision-and-law (discussing efforts 
to ban male circumcision in San Francisco, France, and Germany). 
 2.  See Sam Sokol, Denmark Outlaws Jewish and Muslim Ritual Slaughter as of New Week,
JERUSALEM POST (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.jpost.com/Jewish-World/Jewish-News/Denmark-
outlaws-Jewish-and-Muslim-ritual-slaughter-as-of-next-week-341433 (noting bans in Denmark, Poland, 
Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland). 
 3.  I coordinated the conference, along with Professors Sam Fleischacker (philosophy) and 
Junaid Quadri (religious studies) of the University of Illinois-Chicago. The first and fourth paragraphs 
of this introductory essay draw substantially from the conference statement that the three of us jointly 
authored.
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4 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 90:1 
organized opposition to these religious communities’ ways of life, such as 
opposition to the establishment of the eruvim that permit observant Jews to 
carry objects during the Sabbath. As to the good, the conference organizers 
wanted to explore an extraordinary mechanism in operation in the United 
States that affords religious communities substantial autonomy to resolve 
disputes among their members: courts’ willingness, pursuant to American 
law, to enforce the awards of religious arbitration tribunals. 
Concretely understanding where we are facilitates reflection on the 
normative question of where we should be. And this normative question, it 
seemed to the conference organizers, is usefully approached by considering 
matters from two perspectives. First, what are the appropriate limits on the 
degree to which minority religions (like Islam and Judaism) should be ac-
commodated in a liberal democracy, from the liberal polity’s perspective? 
Second, what are the appropriate limitations on religious communities situ-
ated in liberal democracies, from the internal perspective of Islam and Ju-
daism? As to this last issue, both shari’a and Jewish law have countenanced 
various relationships between religious law and the law of the secular state, 
sometimes even allowing state law to be privileged over religious law. So, 
we conference organizers queried, what are the metes and bounds of the 
circumstances where Jewish and Islamic law allow the sovereign to restrict, 
limit, or suspend certain religious laws? Are such restrictions, limitations, 
or suspensions always viewed as normatively suboptimal from the religious 
community’s perspective, or are they ever seen as a good thing? Are there 
other ways in which the legal systems of diaspora Islamic and Jewish 
communities affected by the liberal democracies in which they find them-
selves, for both good and bad? 
*** 
The first publication in this issue, Opposition to Islamic and Jewish 
Religious Practices in Contemporary America: Overlap and Divergences,
is a transcription of a fascinating roundtable discussion among playwright 
and essayist Wajahat Ali, New York Times journalist and professor at the 
Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism Sam Freedman, and 
Emory University PhD candidate Lee Ann Bambach. Their discussion ex-
plored the background ‘where we presently are’ issues. The discussion 
provides an informative overview of American Islamophobia, identifying 
individuals who have spearheaded anti-Muslim campaigns and politicians 
who have run campaigns that have included anti-shari’a memes. The dis-
cussion also canvasses the anti-shari’a movement’s efforts to pass tens of 
bills restricting the religious freedom of Muslims, and American courts’ 
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2015] INTRODUCTION 5 
uniform rejection of those few that have passed. Interestingly, the discus-
sion also reveals that some of the efforts to oppose religious accommoda-
tion have been spearheaded by co-religionists—meaning that they have 
been intra-group conflicts. The discussants also considered to what extent 
lessons from the Jewish experience of increasing degrees of acceptance in 
mainstream American society may be applied to America’s new Muslim-
American communities, as well as respects in which the two religious 
communities’ situations and experiences are divergent. Discussants also 
considered Islamophobia’s spillover effects on other religious minorities in 
North America and, more generally, the role that growing American secu-
larity is having on traditional accommodationist norms. Finally, the panel-
ists discussed ways in which the Jewish and Moslem communities have 
been working together to combat some of the opposition. 
Professor Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert’s contribution, Installations of 
Jewish Law in Public Urban Space: An American Eruv Controversy, exam-
ines in detail a litigation growing out of a proposed eruv installation in 
Westhampton Beach, New York. An eruv is an “installation of boundary-
marking structures”4—mostly plastic strips and fishing line—that allows 
observant Jews to carry objects outside their homes during the Sabbath. 
Though the installation is “relatively minor, relatively invisible, and entire-
ly permeable because symbolic only,”5 some recent efforts to establish 
eruvin have generated strong public opposition. Against the view that such 
opposition is inevitable on account of the Establishment Clause, Professor 
Fonrobert notes that eruvin have been “installed in many American cities 
without controversy since the 1970s”6 and “have existed for over a centu-
ry”7 in New York City. Professor Fonrobert proceeds to consider the rea-
sons for the recent controversies, and shows that the opposition frequently 
has been led by other Jews. Professor Fonrobert explores the constitutional 
arguments that were advanced in the Westhampton case, and discusses her 
involvement as an expert in the litigation. 
Professor Mustafa Baig’s contribution, Operating Islamic Jurispru-
dence in non-Muslim Jurisdictions: The Case of the United States, provides 
a fascinating account of what Western jurisprudence would call Islamic 
choice-of-law principles. Focusing on the pre-modern Islamic legal tradi-
tion, Baig’s essay examines four related issues. The first is if and when 
Muslims may live under a non-Muslim jurisdiction. While there appears to 
 4.  See infra p. 63. 
 5.  See infra p. 64. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
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6 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 90:1 
be a range of answers given by Islamic jurists, Baig finds a consensus 
among many jurists that Moslems may live in non-Moslem lands so long as 
they can practice their faith without difficulty. Baig next examines the ob-
ligation of Muslims to abide by non-Muslim law when living in non-
Muslim jurisdictions, discussing the principle that if a Muslim enters a non-
Muslim jurisdiction “by way of trade (or other means) it is not permitted 
for him to infringe on their property and life.”8
Next, Baig explores the extent to which Muslim polities have jurisdic-
tion over actions undertaken by Moslems while they are in non-Muslim 
territory. Here, too, jurists in different schools of Islam offer divergent 
answers. While the “Hanafis hold that Muslim jurisdiction cannot extend to 
non-Muslim territory,”9 the other schools “give far less significance”10 to 
geography, and sometimes will apply Islamic law to a Moslem’s wrongdo-
ings in non-Muslim lands. Moreover, even the Hanafi judges, who believe 
Islamic law cannot be extended beyond Muslim territories, sometimes is-
sued fatwas—a verdict short of a legally binding decree—against Muslims 
in non-Muslim lands, demonstrating that “a Muslim will not be relieved 
from his religious sin or his moral obligations in the event of breaking the 
law“11 while in non-Muslim lands. Baig cautions, however, that the jurists’ 
discussions conceived of the Muslims “as temporary sojourners to non-
Muslim lands, and in the case of permanent residency, we can understand 
that there would be no question of applying Islamic law in non-Muslim 
lands.”12
Finally, Baig explores how Muslims living in non-Muslim jurisdic-
tions are to organize their community’s legal affairs. There are to be Mus-
lim judges (or perhaps scholars), and Baig discusses, without resolving, the 
complex question of who has the authority—the non-Muslim polity or the 
Islamic community itself—to appoint those judges. Islamic law’s attentive-
ness to Islamic judges for diaspora Islamic communities is important inso-
far as it addressed “how Muslims could lead a practicing Muslim life”13
while living in non-Muslim lands. Islamic law wants Muslims to “live by 
Islamic laws beyond ritual matters,”14 and therefore “vests authority in 
personalities that have legal and binding power in the absence of an imam
 8.  See infra p. 90.  
 9.  See infra p. 91. 
 10.  See infra p. 94. 
 11.  See infra p. 105. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id.
 14.  Id. 
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in non-Muslim territory.”15 Yet, Baig concludes, “[t]raditional jurists did 
not clearly delineate which areas of the law should be adminis-
tered, . . . leaving it open to the Muslims of a particular time and place.”16
Michael J. Broyde—a law professor, ordained rabbi, rabbinical judge, 
and former member of the rabbinical court known as the Beth Din of 
America—delivered one of the conference’s two keynote addresses. In 
Faith-Based Private Arbitration as a Model for Preserving Rights and 
Values in a Pluralistic Society, Broyde explores how, as a matter of choice-
of-law, American law permits members of religious communities to deter-
mine that their relationships will be governed by religious, rather than state, 
law. Further, Broyde discusses how, as a matter of choice-of-forum, the 
Federal Arbitration Act permits people to contract out of the state’s courts 
and direct their disputes to private arbitration panels whose awards general-
ly will be enforced by state courts. American law’s flexibility as to choice-
of-law and choice-of-forum allows members of religious communities to 
“conduct themselves in accordance with privately held religious values that 
are not reflected in secular law.”17
Drawing on his experience as a judge in such religious tribunals, 
Broyde identifies six principles for ensuring the enforceability of the tribu-
nal’s decision and maintaining the religious tribunal’s respect within the 
religious community. One crucial requirement is that the tribunals comply 
with secular procedural norms. Broyde details many examples of how the 
Beth Din of America does this, stressing (among other things) the im-
portance of having some appellate process internal to the religious tribunal 
that can correct the mistakes that inevitably will be made. While state 
courts will review the procedural fairness of religious tribunals before en-
forcing their judgments, Broyde suggests they do not—and should not—
review the correctness of a religious tribunal’s determinations as to reli-
gious substantive law. 
Even so, Broyde interestingly argues that those who serve on the reli-
gious tribunals must be familiar not only with religious law and the social 
and cultural mores of their religious community, but also, at least regarding 
commercial matters, with “the street law,”18 that is to say with what “is 
actually being followed by people.”19 This is because “Jewish law incorpo-
 15.  See infra p. 106. 
 16.  See infra p. 107. 
 17.  See infra p. 112. 
 18.  See infra p. 127. 
 19.  Id. 
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8 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 90:1 
rates the custom”20 actually followed by people in many commercial mat-
ters. Broyde also urges that religious tribunals include among their three 
members an “expert[] in the particular matter at hand”21—for example a 
dentist in a dental malpractice dispute—even if that person is not a Jewish 
law scholar. The religious communities, Broyde notes, “are in a perpetually 
dynamic relationship with secular law and secular society, incorporating 
secular legal rules and ideas into their commercial and family law—and to 
do justice, the arbitrators chosen by this community need to be part and 
parcel of that process.”22
Echoing Professor Baig’s observations concerning the establishment 
of Islamic judges in non-Islamic lands, Broyde notes that “religious leader-
ship that resolves disputes between parties ultimately serves a role in shap-
ing the community.”23 The tribunals “assume roles in communal 
governance,”24 resolving “not only mundane disputes but also communal 
disputes.”25 Broyde observes that “[o]ver time, this gives the community 
increased structure, stability, and cohesiveness.”26 Broyde is deeply appre-
ciative of the space American law affords religious communities, rightly 
recognizing that the secular state “need not be this friendly to religious 
groups,”27 as is the case in France. According to Broyde, the American 
practice shows that “[l]iberal and secular western democracy is compatible 
with religious community.”28 American law allows different religious 
communities to be “gloriously different, each in its own way, each sharing 
its religious values in a grand whole, and exercising the freedom to main-
tain [its] own set of beliefs and practices within the majestic mosaic of 
diverse communities that make up our United States.”29
Like Professor Broyde, Professor Michael A. Helfand’s contribution, 
Between Law and Religion: Procedural Challenges to Religious Arbitra-
tion Awards, lauds the autonomous space for religious tribunals that is cre-
ated by the United States’ Federal Arbitration Act. But Professor Helfand 
takes issue with the commonly held view, echoed in Broyde’s essay, that 
courts should limit themselves to ensuring the tribunal’s conformity with 
 20.  See infra p. 127. 
 21.  See infra p. 132. 
 22.  See infra p. 133. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  See infra p. 134. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  See infra p. 138. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  See infra p. 140. 
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procedural norms, and never review a religious tribunal’s religious deter-
minations. Helfand interrogates both prongs of this conventional wisdom. 
As to the first, Helfand considers whether a court should refuse to enforce 
an arbitration award where the tribunal, in accordance with religious law, 
refused to allow testimony from the losing party’s star witness only be-
cause she was a woman. Evidentiary rules typically are treated as proce-
dural, and so it might be thought the tribunal’s award should not be 
judicially enforceable. Against this, Helfand provides a consent-based ar-
gument that courts should enforce such awards: “[r]eligious arbitration 
agreements generally incorporate choice-of-law provisions that require the 
tribunal to apply a particular set of religious procedural rules,”30 which 
“ensures that the dispute is resolved in accordance with shared religious 
rules and values—one of the primary motivations behind parties submitting 
disputes for religious arbitration.”31 In the other direction, Helfand consid-
ers at some length several plausible doctrinal grounds that a domestic court 
might rely upon to decline enforcement of such an award. 
As to the second prong, Helfand observes that whereas the awards of 
ordinary arbitrators are subject to judicial review under the manifest disre-
gard of the law standard, “[s]uch limited judicial review is not available in 
the religious arbitration context.”32 The constitutionally based ‘religious 
question doctrine,’ which prevents courts from resolving claims that turn 
on disputes over religious doctrine or practice, “short-circuit[s] the mani-
fest disregard of the law inquiry before it even begins.”33 Helfand thinks 
the lack of any judicial review “opens the door for some significant abuse 
of the arbitral process.”34 Helfand’s main concern seems to be instances 
where a religious tribunal willfully disregards its religious tradition’s law 
(it would be interesting to learn how large a problem this is). Helfand sug-
gests the lack of judicial oversight might make people less likely to seek 
out religious arbitration, thereby undermining the “very infrastructure of 
religious freedom that religious arbitration is intended to provide.”35
Helfand supports a return to the Supreme Court’s earlier approach to reli-
gious disputes, which permitted courts to insure that a religious institution 
had adhered to its own internal religious rules during its decision-making 
process. Helfand believes that the limited state review he endorses can 
 30.  See infra p. 148. 
 31.  Id.
 32.  See infra p. 155. 
 33.  See infra p. 156. 
 34.  See infra p. 159. 
 35.  See infra p. 160. 
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10 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 90:1 
actually help maintain the integrity, both real and perceived, of religious 
tribunals, and thereby ultimately aid religious freedom. 
Professor Mohammad Fadel was the symposium’s second keynote 
speaker. His contribution, Religious Law, Family Law and Arbitration,
addresses the judicial enforcement of religious tribunals awards in family 
law (primarily divorce) that presently is the practice in the United States, 
and which had been in effect in Ontario, Canada until a decade ago. Draw-
ing heavily on renowned political theorist John Rawls, Fadel argues that 
judicial enforcement of tribunal awards, subject to the review provided 
under American law, is fully consistent with Rawlsian liberalism. This is 
true even though, as Fadel illustrates in detail, Islam’s “conceptions of the 
family . . . necessarily conflict in certain respects with the politically liberal 
conception of the family . . . .”36 For example, as Fadel shows, “Islamic 
law’s conception of family law was highly structured by gender, with men 
and women assigned different rights and obligations within the house-
hold.”37 Further, men had the “prerogative to divorce their wives at will as 
well as the right to marry another woman while remaining married to their 
first wife, without recognizing a reciprocal right in the wife.”38 “The rules 
governing custody and guardianship of minor children were similarly gen-
dered,”39 and Islamic inheritance law “provided that males of the same 
class would receive twice as much as similarly situated females.”40
Given Islamic law’s deeply gendered structure, how can a state court’s 
enforcement of a Muslim tribunal’s award based on Islamic law be con-
sistent with liberalism? To begin, Fadel clarifies what he takes to be the 
appropriately limited jurisdictional scope of religious tribunals: they do not, 
and should not, make child custody determinations or interfere with crimi-
nal law. Further, Fadel suggests that many of Islam’s gendered family law 
rules are defaults around which the parties can contract to make them 
“more . . . in line with values of gender egalitarianism.”41
But even with these caveats, Fadel acknowledges that Islamic family 
law is unlikely to coincide with liberal sensibilities regarding gender rela-
tions, and nonetheless argues that “recognition of a qualified right to arbi-
trate family law disputes in accordance with the internal norms of a 
religious community . . . is deeply consistent with the ideals of political 
 36.  See infra p. 164. 
 37.  See infra p. 169. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  See infra p. 170. 
 40.  See infra p. 169. 
 41.  See infra p. 170. 
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liberalism . . . .”42 Fadel reads Rawls as allowing a “pluralism within the 
family,”43 under which the state can properly restrict family life only inso-
far as a community’s way of life interferes with the “reproduction of politi-
cal society.”44 Fadel argues that Islamic family law is not inconsistent with 
this basic requirement “because women [still] enjoy all the basic rights of 
citizens and also have access to the material means necessary to allow them 
to make effective use of their liberties and opportunities.”45 Fadel recogniz-
es that Islamic family law may generate gendered financial outcomes, but 
argues that “[t]he only gender-based inequality that must be abolished as a 
matter of the principles of justice is that which is involuntary.”46 According 
to Fadel, “Religiously justified inequality satisfies the voluntariness re-
quirement because adherence to religion in a politically liberal regime is, 
by definition, voluntary.”47
Interestingly, Fadel also suggests that religious tribunals “may be an 
ideal institution for effecting the kind of interaction between the public 
principles of justice and the internal norms of various religious communi-
ties that may reject some application of those norms.”48 Drawing on Rawls’ 
concept of reflective equilibrium, Fadel suggests that, “[A]rbitration could 
plausibly act as a catalyst in accelerating internal doctrinal reforms within 
Muslim communities on crucial questions, such as what constitutes a fair 
division of property between spouses upon dissolution of the household.”49
*** 
Two broad attitudes toward the relationship between liberalism and re-
ligious communities appear in the articles. One—probably the dominant 
one—reflects the view that according broad autonomy to religious commu-
nities is perfectly consistent with, perhaps even the best instantiation of, 
liberal values.50 The second is that the needs of religious communities give 
rise to a core conflict between competing liberal values—for example, 
between religious freedom and equality. The consent-based arguments that 
 42.  See infra p. 172. 
 43.  See infra p. 171. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  See infra p. 167. 
 46.  Id.
 47.  Id.
 48.  See infra p. 172. 
 49.  See infra p. 182. 
 50.  I myself advanced such an argument earlier in my career. See Mark D. Rosen, The Outer 
Limits of Community Self-Governance in Residential Associations, Municipalities and Indian Country: 
A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REV. 1053 (1998). 
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12 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 90:1 
figure prominently in many of the contribution essays’ analyses are part 
and parcel of the first attitude. But to the extent there may not be real, 
meaningful consent in this context, the first attitude may prove to be less 
tenable than the second. The second attitude does not lead to the conclusion 
that liberal states should not go far toward accommodating religious com-
munities. But an implication of the second attitude is that the issues raised 
in this conference involve real conflicts and dilemmas, and veritable costs 
attend whatever decision is made as to how liberalism’s conflicting com-
mitments are to be harmonized. 
